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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-1024 
___________ 
 
ROBERT PANTON, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN, USP Canaan 
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 10-02517) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 10, 2011 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 18, 2011) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Robert Panton, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying the petition that he 
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filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we 
will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 In 1991, Panton was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 
more than one kilogram of heroin.  See 21 U.S.C. § 846.  According to Panton, the 
underlying offenses were committed between April 1987 and May 1989.  He was 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).  His conviction and 
sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.  See United States v. Lemon, 100 F.3d 942, 
1996 WL 20520 (2d Cir. Jan. 19, 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Panton v. United States, 
519 U.S. 853 (1996).  In 1998, Panton filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  The 
District Court denied relief, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit denied Panton’s request for a certificate of appealability.1  
 In December 2010, Panton filed the present § 2241 petition, alleging that his 
“sentence should be ordered . . . to be parolable as a matter of law” and demanding that 
he be “immediately released.”  Panton notes that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) initially 
determined that he was eligible for parole, but later interpreted his sentence as non-
parolable.  Apparently, the BOP concluded that Panton was subject to the Sentencing 
Reform Act, which replaced “indeterminate sentences and the possibility of parole with 
                                              
1
 Panton next moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to vacate 
the District Court’s denial of his § 2255 motion.  The District Court denied the 
motion, as well as Panton’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of his 60(b) 
motion.   
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determinate sentencing and no parole.”  Lyons v. Mendez, 303 F.3d 285, 288-89 (3d Cir. 
2002) (quoting Walden v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 114 F.3d 1136, 1138 (11th Cir. 1997)).  
The District Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Panton 
failed to demonstrate that a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 would be “inadequate or 
ineffective” to test the legality of his detention.  Panton appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our 
review of the District Court’s dismissal of Panton’s § 2241 petition is plenary.  See 
Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002).  Summary affirmance is 
proper when “it clearly appears that no substantial question is presented or that 
subsequent precedent or a change in circumstances warrants such action.”  3d Cir. I.O.P. 
10.6. 
 The presumptive means by which a federal prisoner can challenge the validity of 
his conviction or sentence is by motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, unless such a 
motion would be “inadequate or ineffective.”  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 
119-20 (3d Cir. 2002).  Lack of success in a previous § 2255 motion, without more, does 
not render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective.  Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539.  To the extent that 
Panton challenges the validity of his sentence, we agree with the District Court that 
dismissal on jurisdictional grounds was proper.  Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 139-
40 (3d Cir. 2002).  But, to the extent that Panton alleged that the BOP is improperly 
executing his sentence, his claim was properly brought under § 2241.  Lyons, 303 F.3d at 
287 (reviewing, on appeal from denial of § 2241 petition, argument that application of 
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amendment to Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) violated the constitutional prohibition 
against ex post facto laws); see also United States v. Kennedy, 851 F.2d 689, 690 (3d Cir. 
1988) (stating that a “challenge to the Parole Commission’s execution of a sentence is 
properly raised in a habeas corpus petition under” § 2241).  Nevertheless, because his 
claim lacks merit, we will affirm the denial of the § 2241 petition.   
 Panton argues in essence that he is eligible for parole because the law in effect 
when he committed his offenses required the United States Parole Commission to set a 
release date within the applicable parole guidelines.  We disagree.  Before November 1, 
1987, the terms of federal sentences were governed by the Parole Commission and 
Reorganization Act of 1976, which authorized the Parole Commission to award early 
release based on “positive institutional adjustment.”  Bledsoe v. United States, 384 F.3d 
1232, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004).  Under the Sentencing Reform Act, which became effective 
on November 1, 1987, parole was to be abolished and “prisoners were to serve uniform 
sentences under sentencing guidelines.”  Id.; see also United States v. Cook, 329 F.3d 
335, 336 (3d Cir. 2003).  Panton was convicted of participation in a conspiracy that lasted 
from April 1987 until May 1989.  Conspiracy is a continuing offense, such that a 
conspirator “remains a participant in the agreement unless and until he communicates or 
otherwise objectively manifests a decision to renounce the agreement.”  United States v. 
Rosa, 891 F.2d 1063, 1069 (3d Cir. 1989).  We have held that continuing offenses such 
as Panton’s, which began before and continued after November 1, 1987, are subject to the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  See id.  at 1068-69; see also United States v. Story, 891 F.2d 
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988, 993-96 (2d Cir. 1989).  Accordingly, relief is not available to Panton under his 
present theory of eligibility for parole.    
 Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Panton’s § 2241 petition.  See 3d Cir. LAR 
27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
